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IN DEFENSE OF APPEARANCES:
WHAT CAPERTON V. MASSEY SHOULD HAVE SAID
Jed Handelsman Shugerman*
INTRODUCTION
In June of 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled for the first time that
an elected judge must recuse himself from a case that involves a major
campaign contributor. In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., a coal
company had been hit with a $50 million jury verdict. While appeal-
ing this verdict, the company's CEO, Don Blankenship, spent $3 mil-
lion to help a challenger, Brent Benjamin, who had no judicial
experience, defeat the incumbent, West Virginia Supreme Court Jus-
tice Warren McGraw. Blankenship funded political attack ads by a
political organization (And for the Sake of the Kids) that was created
to defeat McGraw, alleging that he was soft on child molesters.1 The
well-financed Benjamin won, 53% to 47%, and was the deciding vote
to overturn the jury verdict. In a 5-4 ruling, Justice Anthony M. Ken-
nedy concluded, "There is a serious risk of actual bias when a person
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and dispro-
portionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds
... when the case was pending or imminent."'2 Such political and fi-
nancial influences on the court violate due process and "threaten to
imperil 'public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation's
elected judges.'- 3
In dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. expressed concern for
public confidence too, but with a very different result. The majority's
* Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. I thank Bruce Ackerman, Brad Clark, Shari
Diamond, Dick Fallon, David Fontana, Louis Kaplow, Andy Kaufman, Stephan Landsman,
Martha Minow, David Schleicher, Matthew Stephenson, Bill Stuntz, Jonathan Zittrain, and
Danya Handelsman. Jeremy Bressman and Nooree Lee provided excellent research assistance.
1. Adam Liptak, Judicial Races in Several States Become Partisan Battlegrounds, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2004, at Al; Court Race Goes Negative: Benjamin Opens Campaign with Ads Attacking
McGraw, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 25, 2004; see also YouTube, And for the Sake of the
Kids, http:l/www.youtube.comlwatch?v=HPVTVg56gic&feature=related. A follow-up ad de-
fended these claims. See YouTube, McGraw Wrong Again, http://www.youtube.comlwatch?
v=KZCSMqVMZjI&feature=related. The script is also available at http://www.ncjudges.org/
media/news.releases/ll11.04.html.
2. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2255 (2009).
3. Id. at 2266 (quoting Brief for Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae 4, 11).
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decision, Roberts feared, "will inevitably lead to an increase in allega-
tions that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may
be. The end result will do far more to erode public confidence in judi-
cial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular
case."' 4 Roberts concluded that future Caperton motions will "bring
our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confi-
dence of the American people in the fairness and integrity of their
courts."' 5 In Caperton, Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts en-
gaged in a battle of appearances. For Kennedy, litigants who buy
seats on courts create an appearance of bias that is severe enough to
implicate the right to due process. For Roberts, simply the claims of
bias create an appearance of bias, which he believes is undeserved.
Roberts then goes on to raise "forty questions" about the future appli-
cations of Caperton and its ambiguities, concluding that it creates
more problems than it resolves.
I suggest that in explaining the new recusal rule, the Supreme Court
should have been even more clear that appearances matter. Caperton
requires recusal when a party's campaign support for a judicial candi-
date creates a "risk of actual bias" or a "probability of bias," rather
than an "appearance of bias." However, the "appearance of bias"
standard is more rooted in precedent, and in response to Chief Justice
Roberts's practical concerns in dissent, the "appearance of bias" stan-
dard is actually more practical. I also address Chief Justice Roberts's
pragmatic concerns about the manageability of Caperton motions with
some observations about civil procedure and the actual practice of ju-
dicial elections. Part II argues that the problem of money in judicial
elections is real, and not just an isolated case, as Chief Justice Roberts
suggested.6 Part III then argues that Caperton motions will be rela-
tively manageable. 7 Part IV focuses in particular on the "appearance
of bias" standard as a more established, more practical, and more
manageable standard than the "probability of bias" standard.8 Justice
Kennedy's switch from "appearance of bias" language to the "actual
bias" and "probable bias" language is not an accident. Perhaps mere
"appearances" seem superficial, but the dismissal of appearances be-
cause of its mere appearance, if you will, is itself superficial. The "ap-
pearance of bias" standard is arguably more rooted in Anglo-
American precedents, and appearances of bias are real harms in them-
4. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
6. See infra notes 10-31.
7. See infra notes 32-48.
8. See infra notes 49-96.
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selves. This Article also suggests that the Court should add an "ap-
pearance of justice" standard to capture what may have really been
going on in West Virginia: the purchasing of a seat for a true believer
who needed no political pressure to bias him in favor of Blankenship
and Massey. Part V suggests that the Court does not need to seek
perfect clarity in these rulings. In fact, ambiguity and uncertainty
have their distinct advantages among reputation-protecting judges and
risk-averse parties and lawyers, as long as the Supreme Court does not
ignore these issues now that it already has entered the fray. The most
important decisions in the future are the decisions to grant certiorari
every so often, rather than the exact wording of its decisions.
II. Is THERE A REAL PROBLEM?
Chief Justice Roberts argues that the majority is opening up a flood
of motions that allege bias, and he worries that these motions will cre-
ate an unfair appearance of a problem in state courts. If there is little
reality to the problem of political donations to judicial campaigns,
then there is not much cause to worry about frivolous Caperton mo-
tions. If there is a real underlying problem, then resolving these mo-
tions is potentially complicated. Which is it?
The multi-million-dollar price tag on a West Virginia state supreme
court seat and the nastiness of its campaign are increasingly common.9
Almost 90% of state judges face some kind of popular election. 10
Thirty-eight states put all of their judges up before the voters.11
Spending on judicial campaigns has doubled in the past decade, with
44% of those donations coming from business groups and 21% from
lawyers. 12 In 2004, the seventeen most expensive judicial elections
cost a total of $47 million in direct contributions. 13 In 2006, the eleven
most expensive elections cost over $34 million, including $13 million
raised for an Alabama supreme court seat and over $2 million per
supreme court seat in Kentucky, North Carolina, Nevada, Ohio, and
9. See generally David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2008).
10. Matthew J. Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING
POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1, 7 (Matthew J. Streb ed.,
2007).
11. The nine states that select judges by gubernatorial appointment are Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
New York's lower court judges are elected, but not the judges on its highest court, the Court of
Appeals. South Carolina and Virginia use legislative appointment.
12. JAMES SAMPLE, LAUREN JONES & RACHEL WEISS, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2006, at 18 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2006), https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/
handle/10207/8749/9The%2ONew%2OPolitics%20of%2OJudicial%20Elections%20-%202006.pdf
?sequence=l.
13. Editorial, The Best Judges Business Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007, at A18.
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Texas. 14 In 2008, incumbent supreme court justices in Michigan and
Wisconsin were defeated in multi-million-dollar campaigns. In Wis-
consin, Justice Louis Butler lost his race, which cost a total of almost
$6 million.1 5 In Michigan, Chief Justice Cliff Taylor lost a race costing
more than $7 million between the two sides.1 6 Studies find that
elected judges disproportionately rule in favor of their campaign con-
tributors, although it is difficult to prove whether the contribution
causes the judge to reach that result or whether the contributors have
picked true believers in their cause.17
Cases like Caperton v. Massey have come up recently. For example,
in May 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a
class action against State Farm Insurance.' 8 State Farm was challeng-
ing a $1 billion verdict, including $456 million in contractual damages,
in favor of a class consisting of 4.7 million policyholders in forty-eight
states.19 The court was split on the case, and the Justices held their
decision until the seventh and deciding Justice was elected in Novem-
ber 2004, about a year and a half later.20 With the case hanging in the
balance, Republican Lloyd Karmeier and Democrat Gordon Maag
raised a total of $9.3 million, mostly from repeat players in Illinois
courts.21 State Farm employees and other insurance groups gave al-
most $1.5 million directly to Karmeier, plus $2.3 million from the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce.22 Trial lawyers gave $2.8 million to Maag
through the state Democratic Party.23 Remarkably, the race was not
even state-wide, but in one of the rural districts in southern Illinois
outside the expensive Chicago media market. Outside groups at-
tacked both candidates for leniency in graphic criminal cases. 24 One
14. Id.; JUSTICE AT STAKE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006 at 16 fig. 9
(2006), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cmsfNewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006_D2A2449B
77CDA.pdf.
15. Stacy Foster, Spending in Supreme Court Race Just Under $6 Million, MILWAUKEE J. SEN-
TINEL, July 22, 2008.
16. Justice at Stake, 2008 Supreme Court Elections: More Money, More Nastiness, http://
temp.justiceatstake.org/node/63.
17. See Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision
Making (Aug. 10, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991364;
Adam Liptak, Looking Anew at Campaign Cash and Elected Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008,
at A14; Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at Al.
18. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 810 (I11. 2005).
19. Id.
20. James Sample, The Campaign Trial, SLATE, Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com.




24. Id. at 10.
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anti-Karmeier ad, over ominous music and a blurry image of children
at a playground, warns, "He used candy to lure the children into the
house. Once inside, the three children were sexually molested. A 4-
year-old girl, raped. Despite prosecutors' objections, Judge Lloyd
Karmeier gave him probation. '25 True, he had sentenced Bryan Wat-
ters, a mentally disabled man, to probation, but only after his original
six-year sentence was overturned by an appeals court, which recom-
mended probation instead.2 6
Karmeier survived these attacks (in part because of his financial ad-
vantage) and won the race. He commented that the fundraising was
"obscene,"2 7 but he did not complain about winning, and he did not
recuse himself from the State Farm case. He cast the decisive vote
overturning the verdict against State Farm for breach of contract.
One might say that State Farm received a return of $456 million on a
savvy investment of about $1 million.28 In 2006, the U.S. Supreme
Court refused to hear the appeal, and it did not address this issue until
Caperton.2 9
More and more polling indicates that the public already perceives a
problem, with or without Caperton creating new litigation. For exam-
ple, in the midst of Michigan's expensive 2008 race, large majorities of
Michigan voters perceived a problem of bias: 63% believed that cam-
paign contributions affect judges' decisions, and 85% answered that
judges should recuse themselves from a case when a party had con-
tributed more than $50,000 to their campaigns. 30 The briefs in
Caperton offered similar polling results. 31 These facts undercut Chief
Justice Roberts's argument that the Caperton decision is creating a
false impression of a problem. But perhaps these facts bolster his
main dissenting argument: the majority's decision will produce an un-
manageable wave of due process litigation. The next Part explains
why federal courts and most state courts will not be overwhelmed.
25. Adam Liptak, Judicial Races in Several States Become Partisan Battlegrounds, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2004, at Al.
26. Id.
27. Sample, supra note 20.
28. Id.
29. Avery v. State Farm, 547 U.S. 1003 (2006).
30. Ed Brayton, Symposium Puts Spotlight on Danger of Judicial Elections, MICH. MESSEN-
GER, Mar. 23, 2009.
31. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 13, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 192 S. Ct. 2252
(2009) (No. 08-22); id. at 24; Brief of Justice at Stake et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 15, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 192 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22). But see
Brief of Amicus Curiae James Madison Center for Free Speech Supporting Respondents at 3-4,
20-21, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 192 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22); id. at 9-10, 32-34.
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III. FORTY QUESTIONS, AND SOME ANSWERS
To argue that Caperton motions create an appearance of bias in the
courts is similar to arguing that claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel create an appearance of incompetence in criminal trials, or
that the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act of 1964 cre-
ate an appearance of racial or gender bias in society. The problems of
unfairness are real, and a wave of litigation draws more attention to
those problems. Yet it is still valid to ask, as Chief Justice Roberts
does with his forty practical questions, whether "the cure is worse
than the disease."' 32 However, the cure's side effects should not be
exaggerated.
Above, I discussed the explosion of money in many state judicial
races over the past decade. 33 But it is also important to recognize that
this explosion is limited to a fairly defined set of states. There are four
basic models of judicial selection in the states: gubernatorial appoint-
ment; partisan elections; nonpartisan elections; and the "merit plan,"
in which a nominating commission composed of bar professionals and
a mix of other officials offers three names to the governor, the gover-
nor appoints one from the list, and that judge later runs in a yes-or-no
retention election to hold that seat. All of the million-dollar and
multi-million-dollar judicial elections were from two of these models:
partisan or non-partisan races, with partisan races tending to be more
expensive than non-partisan races. A dozen states have appointed
judges, and although appointments are not immune from politics, the
influence of money is far less direct. The retention elections that are
part of the merit plan also stand in stark contrast to partisan and non-
partisan races, based upon a closer look at state-by-state campaign
finance reporting.3 4 In ten retention elections in 2004, the incumbent
raised not a single dollar and outside funds were marginal.3 5 In only
two retention elections in 2004, incumbents raised relatively small
amounts of money-400,000 in New Mexico and $8,000 in Idaho.3 6
The patterns were similar in 2000, 2006, and 2008, in which almost
every judge running in retention elections raised no money, and all
32. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
33. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
34. The state-by-state campaign finance reporting is collected from the American Judicature
Society and from the National Institute of Money in State Politics. See American Judicature
Society, Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.judicialselection.us (last visited Sept. 6,
2009); National Institute on Money in State Politics, Follow the Money, http://www.followthe





won their retention elections. 37 From 2000 to 2008, only the New
Mexico merit-plan retention election and a quasi-merit retention elec-
tion in California cost more than $100,000.
One reason that merit-selected judges raise no money is that reten-
tion elections offer strong job security, and thus, these judges very
rarely face organized and well-financed opposition. And one reason
potential opponents decide not to invest in challenges is that it is so
difficult to defeat incumbents. Between 1% and 2% of judges running
in retention elections have been defeated, while incumbents in parti-
san elections are defeated in 23% of their races, and incumbents in
non-partisan elections are defeated in roughly 8% to 9% of their
races. 38 By comparison, 5% to 6% of incumbent congressmen were
defeated over the same time period. 39 Judges in merit selection states
tend to face a built-in competitive disadvantage because they run in
retention elections without necessarily having any background in
campaigning. They were appointed to their seat, and although they
often run in an election for the very first time to retain that seat, they
win overwhelmingly. The retention election system reduces the incen-
tives for a judge's opponents to invest in her defeat because those
opponents do not choose the replacement, but instead rely on a merit
commission to fill the seat. If these interests do not control the plural-
ist merit commissions and the governorship as well, they have little
reason to expect much return on their investment in defeating the in-
cumbent. And perhaps merit selection produces better judges who
get reelected more easily.
A plurality of states use the merit plan, and when combined with
the appointive states, a total of over thirty states have no campaign
money flowing.40 Of course, that leaves almost twenty states with va-
rying amounts of campaign money and varying degrees of Caperton
complexity. However, these states do not create serious problems for
federal courts in managing Caperton claims. The only federal court
that can review these kinds of claims from state civil cases is the U.S.
Supreme Court on direct appeal from state supreme courts. The fed-
eral district courts cannot review civil cases in state court for Caperton
due process questions, and there is nothing like habeas corpus in civil
37. Id.
38. Melinda Gann Hall, Competition As Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 165, 167 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007).
39. Id. at 167.
40. See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.judicial
selection.us (last visited Sept. 6, 2009); National Institute on Money in State Politics, Follow the
Money, http://www.followthemoney.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2009).
2010]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
cases. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court can use the discretionary
certiorari procedure to ignore as many Caperton claims as it wants,
and four justices can simply wait for an extreme case for which to
grant certiorari. The Supreme Court's discretionary and direct juris-
diction over the state courts resolves some of the procedural
problems, but others remain. What about Caperton claims in habeas
corpus appeals from state criminal cases? Justice Kennedy's opinion
in Caperton focused on the problem of donations and campaign sup-
port from litigants and lawyers: "The inquiry centers on the contribu-
tion's relative size in comparison to the total amount of money
contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election,
and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the
election. '41 The state and the prosecutor do not donate to the judges'
campaigns. Caperton could be expanded to cover other questions of
political bias relating to criminal defendants, and perhaps federal
courts should do so. However, that result is unlikely, and current
habeas law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) gives skeptical federal courts the tools to dispatch these
claims quickly.42 Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern that, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), civil state litigants might be able to sue their
judges in federal courts for the violation of their constitutional
rights.43 However, judicial immunity casts a broad shield against such
litigation.44
There is also a "gaming the system" or "chutzpah" problem. The
amicus briefs filed on behalf of Massey Energy, and opposing recusal,
argue that parties could donate money strategically in order to trigger
the recusal of unsympathetic judges.45 They cite then-Circuit Judge
Stephen Breyer's warning in 1989 that the recusal standard must be
crafted to "prevent parties from too easily obtaining the disqualifica-
tion of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system for strate-
gic reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to their liking. ' 46 A
litigant might even donate money to a judge who is generally unsym-
pathetic to his or her interests, just to be able to disqualify that judge
41. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264 (2009).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
43. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2271 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
44. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
45. Amicus Brief of the States of Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan
and Utah in Support of Respondents at 36, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009) (No. 08-22).
46. In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 59:529
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in the future. 47 Imagine a labor union giving money directly to a con-
servative judge or providing indirect support in the form of advertis-
ing so that this conservative judge must later recuse himself, to the
benefit of the labor union. This direct strategic move might seem to
be a real problem for recusal's manageability, but it is not. The solu-
tion rests in what I would call the "chutzpah" rule: you may not give
money to a judge and then complain of bias. Doing so is analogous to
the classic example of chutzpah: killing your parents and then throw-
ing yourself on the mercy of the court as an orphan. Similarly, a liti-
gant might also spend money to defeat a judge unsuccessfully (for
example, in a retention election) and then step into court and move
for recusal based on his own past opposition to that judge. This would
be a no-lose situation in which one either tries to defeat the judge or
later gets to avoid the judge, but again, the chutzpah rule applies. An
individual has no right to complain of the effects of one's own freely
chosen donations. A litigant may invoke Caperton only with respect
to another person's donations.
But there is actually a more complicated scenario. Let us say that
State Farm Insurance gives a large amount of money to a Louisiana
judge, Judge X. That Louisiana judge then presides over a case
against defendant Aetna with millions of dollars at stake. Aetna
moves to recuse, or the plaintiffs move to recuse. When is recusal the
right result? Was State Farm's donation an indication of pro-insur-
ance bias or anti-insurance bias? In other words, when is the donation
a kind of strategic manipulation of a recusal rule, such that recusal
would subvert due process? Consider the following four scenarios.
Scenario 1: Was State Farm's donation "direct support" or "collu-
sive support"? Judge X is pro-insurance, and State Farm wants the
pro-insurance judge to hear the case and establish pro-insurance
precedents. In the alternative, State Farm may have a mutual collu-
sive deal to help out Aetna when either company has pending
litigation.
Scenario 2: Was State Farm's donation "direct strategy" or "collu-
sive strategy"? Judge X is pro-consumer and anti-insurance, and State
Farm's donation was made in collusion with Aetna in order to trigger
X's recusal, either to get a more favorable precedent for State Farm or
to execute a collusive deal to help Aetna.
47. Amicus Brief of the States of Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan
and Utah in Support of Respondents at 36, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009) (No. 08-22) ("[I]t would be a simple expedient for a party or a lawyer to 'mold' the court
that will hear his or her cases by tailoring contributions and opposition contributions.").
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Scenario 3: Was State Farm's donation a form of competitive sup-
port for Judge X? Judge X is pro-consumer and anti-insurance, and
State Farm is seeking a competitive advantage over Aetna. Let us say
that Aetna is over-exposed in Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina,
and State Farm wants a liberal judge who will maximize Aetna's
losses.
Scenario 4: Was State Farm's donation a "competitive strategy"?
Judge X is pro-insurance or anti-consumer, and State Farm wanted to
trigger Judge X's recusal-by the plaintiff's recusal motion-in order
to eliminate a judge who otherwise would have minimized Aetna's
losses.
Are these scenarios outlandish? Given the amount of money at
stake in state courts, it would be naive to assume that parties would
not attempt to manipulate court cases. After all, State Farm and Mas-
sey Coal Co. demonstrated that they could buy seats, and therefore
buy court decisions worth tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions,
of dollars. If it takes millions to win a seat, why not spend less money
on a strategy to force unsympathetic judges to recuse themselves?
Given these four different scenarios, when is recusal appropriate
and when would it be a strategic subversion of the rule? One answer
is to rely on the judge, but relying on judges to recuse themselves is
how we arrived at judicial plutocracy to begin with.
The answer is that one must impute a political identity to Judge X.
Only when a court is willing to say explicitly that "Judge X is pro-
insurance" or "Judge X is pro-consumer" can we resolve this puzzle.
But what court is so deeply committed to legal realism that it is willing
to impute political preferences-and regularly undermine judges' rep-
utations-in its official decisions? There are limits to legal realism in
judicial opinions. Just as it is inappropriate to complain in a dissent
that the judge writing the majority should have eaten something else
for breakfast, it is understandable that reviewing judges would prefer
to avoid such explicit rulings with a ten-foot pole, and that they would
show great deference to the recusal decisions of other judges.
Some of the scholars who have addressed the problem of judicial
campaign contributions have called for campaign finance regulations.
Most of these proposals would be swept under by a "trickle-around"
effect. Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan have described the hy-
draulics: "[P]olitical money, like water, has to go somewhere. '48
48. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999); see also Daniel R. Ortiz, Commentary, Water, Water Every-
where, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1742-43 (1999) (citing Issacharoff and Karlan's "evocative hydrau-
lic metaphor" and noting that "[i]f we constrict one path, it will take another").
538. [Vol. 59:529
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Under this new recusal regime, money surely will go into strategic ma-
nipulation. It is important to recognize that the Supreme Court can
use its discretionary jurisdiction to deny certiorari and prevent the
manipulation of recusal rules.
Yet questions still persist, even beyond Chief Justice Roberts's
forty. Why is recusal limited to campaign support in judicial elec-
tions? Arguably, there is more risk of bias in appointments when
judges owe more of their seat to one individual, and when judges rely
on one individual for promotion to higher courts. Parties may not
exercise as much power over judicial appointments as in partisan elec-
tions, but they still wield a lot of influence. Political power also affects
a judge's prospects of elevation, so fear and favor can affect judges
who enjoy life tenure at one level, but who also have ambitions to
move up the judicial hierarchy, or perhaps run for other offices. Fed-
eral judges and appointed judges are thus subject to similar concerns
about bias.
These concerns about risks and appearances are not limited to past
donors and past supporters. What about a judge who is facing a re-
election and is hearing a case before a particularly powerful litigant or
lawyer who has not donated in the past but who would be more likely
to do so after a favorable ruling-or even more, to support an oppo-
nent after an unfavorable ruling? The past contribution is a signal to
the judge of an interest, but what about potential future support or
opposition creating an appearance of bias?
The Supreme Court's discretionary use of certiorari may keep the
federal courts clean, allowing the Court to pick out an extreme case
every so often for full review. But the states do not have such proce-
dural freedom. State litigants will file Caperton claims at each stage.
Most of these claims will be dismissed easily, but some will be more
difficult. Now that the Supreme Court has entered the fray, it should
continue to hear these cases to clarify the standard and to embolden
appellate judges who may feel the awkwardness of disqualifying their
colleagues and lower court judges, or the confusion of sorting through
real versus manufactured conflicts. The first step is changing the
Caperton standard to make it more clear and more practical, as I dis-
cuss in the next Part.
IV. "APPEARANCE" OVER REALITY
Chief Justice Roberts is right: the majority in Caperton leaves lots of
unresolved questions, and they will have to be sorted out by the state
courts, if not the Supreme Court. The majority decision in Caperton
could have made that task simpler. Instead of focusing on the
2010] 539
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"probability of actual bias," it should have focused on the "appear-
ance" of bias. Kennedy used the phrase "actual bias" eighteen times
and the phrase "probability of bias" twice, and together they consti-
tuted the majority's due process standard. 49 Kennedy stated that "ac-
tual bias" was rooted in Supreme Court precedent.50 By contrast,
Justice Kennedy used the word "appearance" only four times. The
first time, he was setting forth the case's background, and he quoted
Justice Benjamin's criticism of "a standard merely of appearances" as
"an invitation to subject West Virginia's justice system to the vagaries
of the day-a framework in which predictability and stability yield to
supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations." 51
The other three times were merely references to West Virginia's and
other states' non-constitutional ethics rules. 52 Not once was "appear-
ance" used as part of the Supreme Court's due process analysis, nor
was it ever cited as part of Supreme Court precedent.5 3 In response to
the Court's choice of wording, Chief Justice Roberts hammers again
and again on the "probability of bias" language as a weakness in the
majority formulation.
What is the big deal about this apparently minor difference? Is Jus-
tice Benjamin right? Why should courts stop at mere appearances in-
stead of inquiring into actual bias? Is it contradictory in a due process
case to turn to a seemingly superficial shorthand instead of pursuing
the truth? In fact, a rule based on the appearance of justice-and
conversely, the appearance of impropriety or partiality-is a remarka-
bly important part of the due process analysis for a number of reasons.
Initially, Justice Kennedy himself seemed to prefer the appearance
standard. In oral argument for Caperton v. Massey, when the respon-
dents argued against an "appearance of bias" standard, Justice Ken-
nedy defended it with vague references to some of these reasons, and
in the process, he tipped his hand on how he would rule:
I want you to be able to elaborate your full theory of the case, butjust so you know, it-it does seem to me that the appearance stan-
dard has-has much to recommend it. In part it means that you
don't have to inquire into the actual bias; it's-it's more objective.
Now, of course it has to be controlled, it has to be precise. But I just
thought that you know that I-I do have that inclination. 54
49. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257, 2259 (2009).
50. Id. at 2257.
51. Id. at 2259.
52. Id. at 2266.
53. Id.




When the respondents argued that due process is not about something
as superficial as appearances, Justice Kennedy replied, "But our whole
system is designed to ensure confidence in our judgments.... And it
seems-it seems to me litigants have an entitlement to that under the
Due Process Clause."'55 From these unambiguous signals, it appears
that an "appearance of bias" standard had five votes as of March 3,
2009.
Justice Kennedy's switch from "appearance of bias" language to the
"actual bias" and "probable bias" language could have been acciden-
tal, but more likely, he may have been wary about resting due process
on appearances, rather than real harms, and the "probability of actual
bias" standard seems to address real harm without having to prove
something so inherently subjective. Mere "appearances" may seem
superficial, but appearances are actually more substantial than they
appear, so to speak. The "appearance of bias" standard is just as
firmly rooted in Anglo-American precedents, it is more practical for
courts, and moreover, appearances of bias are real harms in
themselves.
First, the appearance of impropriety creates actual harms. As Jus-
tice Kennedy's comment in oral argument suggests, a justice system
depends upon the public's faith in the proceedings so that the law re-
mains legitimate. A justice system also depends upon the litigants'
trust so that they comply with the court's ruling. As Balzac once
wrote, "To distrust the judiciary marks the beginning of the end of
society."' 56 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct states, "Deference to
the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence
in the integrity and independence of judges .. . [which] depends in
turn upon their acting without fear or favor. '57 The rule of law relies
upon the appearance of a rule of law, rather than a rule of politics and
personal preferences.
Second, self-enforcement through recusal is far preferable to appel-
late enforcement through disqualification. A judge will rarely admit
actual bias, in part because such a confession has reputational costs
and runs against the professional ethos, and in part because judges
often sincerely believe that they can overcome prejudices and adjudi-
cate fairly. A rule of appearances allows the judge to recuse with dig-
nity, without the confession of bias.
55. Id. at 37.
56. HONORE DE BALZAC, SPLENDEURS ET MISF-RES DES COURTISANES AND OTHER STORIES
(1898), quoted in Otto Kirchheimer, Conditions of Judicial Action, in THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE:
READINGS IN JUDICIAL ETHICS 50, 51 (John T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth I. Winston eds., 1993).
57. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990).
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Third, it arguably makes sense for trial judges to err in favor of
recusal in terms of judicial economy. There is less harm in recusing
too frequently than too rarely. For example, in the first scenario, a
different judge with less of a potential conflict simply hears the case,
generating minor procedural costs and delays; in the second, the result
will be more appeals with remands and new trials, in addition to the
general cost of allowing more actual bias. If a judge recuses herself, it
generally comes very early in the proceedings and wastes fewer re-
sources of the parties or the courts.
Fourth, as an evidentiary matter, it is exceedingly difficult to get.
inside a judge's head and prove actual bias. Risks of temptation and
appearances are a more workable approach to due process. When
Justice Kennedy commented in oral argument that an "appearance"
inquiry is more objective, he was adverting to this advantage in terms
of practicality.
Fifth, appellate judges prefer to avoid accusing lower court judges
of actual bias; it creates awkward moments at the state courthouse
cafeteria. Under an appearance standard, an appellate court can ex-
press confidence in its colleague's impartiality but still disqualify that
judge while not having to avoid him at cocktail parties.
Finally, the term "appearance" is already the familiar standard in
the codes of judicial conduct around the country. Canon 2 of the
American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct
states, "A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impro-
priety in all of the judge's activities. '58 Canon 3E has a variation on
the same problem of perceptions: "A judge shall disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. '59 As the majority opinion in Caperton notes, the ABA
Model Code's test for the appearance of impropriety is "whether the
conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the
judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, im-
partiality and competence is impaired." 60 Most states have adopted
either the "appearances" language or "perception" language under
their codes of conduct or supreme court decisions.61 State judges al-
58. Id. Canon 2.
59. Id. Canon 3E(1).
60. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009) (citing MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt.).
61. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGES (1996); see, e.g., Ogden v. Ogden, 39 P.3d 513, 516 (Alaska 2001) (citing ALASKA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A)); In re Ackel, 155 Ariz. 34, 38 (1987) (citing Canons 1
and 2(A) of the Judicial Code of Conduct as adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court); ARK.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5); CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
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ready apply the standard to other questions of bias and interests, such
as financial investments.
The Supreme Court's precedents have reflected a concern for ap-
pearances and mere temptations, rather than actual bias. Tumey v.
Ohio was the first major case to establish these principles for disquali-
fication under the due process clause. 62 In 1926, a mayor who was
acting as a judge tried and convicted Tumey for violating Ohio's Pro-
hibition Act.63 The statute provided the mayor with $12, ostensibly
for trial costs, but only for convictions. 64 Additionally, the town re-
ceived Tumey's $100 fine.65 The mayor denied Tumey's recusal re-
quest.66 Holding that such a system violated the defendant's due
process guarantee against a biased tribunal, the Supreme Court re-
jected the requirement of proving actual bias.67 Writing for a unani-
mous Court, Chief Justice William H. Taft first approached the
disqualification rule narrowly. He recognized that "of course, the
general rule [is that judges] are disqualified by their interest in the
controversy to be decided. '68 He first articulated a limited right to
disqualify a judge for "a direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary
interest" in the case. 69
There may have been reason to think that this standard, by itself,
provided only a narrow right, especially in terms of directness and
substance. However, Chief Justice Taft continued in Tumey to
broaden the right. Instead of returning to the "direct" and "substan-
tial" language, Chief Justice Taft, in the next passage, emphasized that
even relatively small incentives were still intolerable.70 He quoted
Judge Thomas Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, which explained
3C(1)(a) ("A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which ... his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where.., he has a personal bias
or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding..."); S.S. v. Wakefield, 764 P.2d 70, 73 (Colo. 1988) (citing COLO. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT" Canon 2); State v. Shabazz, 246 Conn. 746, 768 (1998) (citing CorN. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(c)); Mejia v. United States, 916 A.2d 900, 902 (D.C. 2007); Stein
v. State, 995 So. 2d 329, 344 (Fla. 2008); State v. Brantley, 56 P.3d 1252, 1273 (Haw. 2002); In re
Cooks, 694 So. 2d 892, 903 (La. 1997); State v. Henderson, 277 Neb. 240, 261 (2009); Lujan v.
New Mexico State Police Bd., 667 P.2d 456 (N.M. 1983); In re Disqualification of Hoover, 863
N.E.2d 634, 635 (Ohio 2006); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989); City of Bellevue v.
Hellenthal, 28 P.3d 744, 752 (Wash. 2001).
62. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 527 (1927).
63. Id. at 515.
64. Id. at 531-32.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 515.
67. Id. at 522-23.
68. Id. at 522.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 523-24.
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that courts required disqualification unless the interest was "so re-
mote, trifling and insignificant that it may fairly be supposed to be
incapable of affecting the judgment of or of influencing the conduct of
an individual. ' 71 Even though the mayor did not collect a particularly
large sum from each individual conviction or from the total monthly
convictions (roughly $100 a month, or $960 in 2006 dollars), Taft con-
cluded, "We can not regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an
emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling or insignificant
interest. '7 2 Chief Justice Taft may have been unaware that Thomas
Cooley had time to revise the canonical Constitutional Limitations and
his other treatises because he had been defeated in his reelection bid
for a seat on the Michigan Supreme Court in 1884, an election year in
which the Democratic ticket trounced the Republican ticket through-
out the state.73
Chief Justice Taft continued to expand the standard:
There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a considera-
tion as $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it; but the
requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satis-
fied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest
self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter
due process of law. 74
Due process disqualifications would apply to interests that were "pos-
sible temptations to the average man," a standard far more expansive
than the initial "direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary" lan-
guage. More an aspirational goal than a legal standard, the language
71. Id. at 531 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
594 (7th ed. 1903)).
72. Id. at 532.
73. See George Edwards, Why Justice Cooley Left the Bench: A Missing Page of Legal History,
33 WAYNE L. REV. 1563-65 (1987); PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW
AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION 67 (1999); see also Paul D. Carrington, Law As "The Common
Thoughts of Men": The Law- Teaching and Judging of Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 495, 495-97 (1997).
74. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (emphasis added). Alternatively, Chief Justice
Taft explained that the mayor's role as the executive of his village placed him in "two practically
and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, [which] necessarily in-
volves a lack of due process of law." Id. at 534. If a partisan position undermines one's judicial
position and thus due process, the Taft Court would probably have had questions about judicial
elections. But alas, it did not address that issue.
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of "a balance nice, clear and true" has appeared in recent Supreme
Court cases, such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.75
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court extended the law of disqualifica-
tion under due process to the appearance of bias and the "appearance
of justice." In 1955, the Supreme Court elaborated upon Tumey. Af-
ter citing Tumey's "possible temptation" and "balance nice, clear and
true" language, the Court acknowledged, "Such a stringent rule may
sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would
do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between con-
tending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way 'jus-
tice must satisfy the appearance of justice."' 76
The Burger Court broadened the disqualification rule to include
less and less direct financial incentives. The Court extended Tumey in
a similar case, Ward v. Village of Monroeville, in which the mayor did
not receive compensation for convictions but the town received the
fines. 77 The influence of the public financing over the proceedings
was less direct than the immediate payoff in Tumey, and the Court
found no "direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary interest. '78
Instead, the Court applied the "possible temptation" standard from
Tumey and found a violation of due process.79 In a later case, the
Burger Court also found a violation of due process in criminal pro-
ceedings where there was a "likelihood of bias or an appearance of
bias." 80
In 1986, the Supreme Court dramatically extended this rule in Lav-
oie v. Aetna.81 Margaret Lavoie sued Aetna Life Insurance in an Ala-
bama state court for refusing to pay for her medical treatment.82 For
payment of her original claim and for punitive damages for the tort of
bad faith refusal to pay a valid claim, a jury awarded $3.5 million in
75. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc.
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 618 (1993); Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 n.12 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,822
(1986).
76. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
(1954)). In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 75 U.S. 813, 825 (1986), the Supreme Court cited
this language approvingly.
77. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
78. Id. at 60-62.
79. Id. at 60.
80. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974); see also Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250
(1977) (holding that a payment of $5 to a justice of the peace for each warrant he issued-his
sole compensation-is a "direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary interest" that violates due
process).
81. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
82. Id. at 815.
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punitive damages. 83 In a 5-4 per curiam decision, the Alabama Su-
preme Court affirmed the award.84 Aetna then learned that Justice T.
Eric Embry, one of the Justices in the majority, had filed two suits in
state court alleging bad faith failure to pay a claim against two other
insurance companies; both suits sought punitive damages and one was
a class action.85 Aetna filed a motion for rehearing with a request for
the Justice to recuse himself, but the motions were denied. 86 Aetna
then discovered that Justice Embry had written the per curiam. On
appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that he received a $30,000 set-
tlement for his claims after the state court decision, and then he re-
signed "for health reasons" in between the state proceedings and the
U.S. Supreme Court decision.87
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger began
with the narrow Tumey rule against "direct, personal, substantial,
[and] pecuniary interest. 88 He then added the broader Murchison
rule that "under the Due Process Clause no judge 'can be a judge in
his own case [or be] permitted to try cases where he has an interest in
the outcome,"' and that the degree or kind of interest that would be
sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting "cannot be defined with
precision." 89 He summed up the rule with the broad Tumey language:
"Nonetheless, a reasonable formulation of the issue is whether the
'situation is one which would offer a possible temptation to the aver-
age ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true.' ,9
The Court found that Justice Embry's per curiam opinion had the
"clear and immediate effect" of strengthening his own case, and that
he acted as "a judge in his own case." 91 Rather than relying on the
narrow disqualifying factors, the Court concluded its discussion of Jus-
tice Embry's conflict with the broadest language:
We make clear that we are not required to decide whether in fact
Justice Embry was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case
then before the Supreme Court of Alabama "would offer a possible
temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true." The Due Process Clause "may some-
times bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do
83. Id. at 816.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 817.
86. Id. at 817-18.
87. Id. at 822 n.2.
88. Id. at 821-22.
89. Id. at 822.
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 824, 829.
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their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between con-
tending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way,
'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."' 92
The Court also returned to Thomas Cooley's limiting principle that
recusal is not required where the interest is "so remote, trifling and
insignificant that it may fairly be supposed to be incapable of affecting
the judgment of or of influencing the conduct of an individual. 93
Justice William Brennan's concurrence noted that the Court previ-
ously had found due process violations in cases that had fallen short of
the "direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary" test, and he sug-
gested that even under this test, "an interest is sufficiently 'direct' if
the outcome of the challenged proceeding substantially advances the
judge's opportunity to attain some desired goal even if that goal is not
actually attained in that proceeding. ' 94 The Court's decision in Lav-
oie, regardless of the doctrine, may have been driven by the audacity
of Judge Embry's behavior. Nevertheless, the Court chose remarka-
bly open-ended language, raising high expectations for impartiality
and recusal in the face of indirect conflicts. Later, Justice Kennedy
himself applied an "appearance of partiality" test in a 1994
concurrence.
95
The maxim "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" runs
throughout the cases from Tumey to Lavoie.96 Thus, the appearance
92. Id. at 825 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 826 n.3. For an example of a remote and insignificant interest, see Marshall v. Jer-
rico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980). In Jerrico, a Labor Department official penalized Jerrico for
violating child labor laws, and a portion of the fines reimbursed the agency's enforcement costs,
as provided by statute. The Court held that this payment did not create a sufficient interest in
the case because the official would not profit personally, and the payment to the institution was
not sufficiently large so as to affect his judgment.
94. Aetna, 475 U.S. at 829-30 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Harry Blackmun wrote a
concurrence, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, noting that this decision did not turn on the
fact that Justice Embry was the deciding vote. Id. at 833 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause occurred when Justice Embry sat on this case, for it was then the
danger arose that his vote and his views, potentially tainted by his interest in the pending Blue
Cross suit, would influence the votes and views of his colleagues.").
95. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 558 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96. An insightful article on these cases suggests that "the Court seems much more concerned
with probabilities than with appearances, and the 'appearance of impropriety' language seems to
be mere icing on the 'probability of unfairness' cake." Mark Andrew Grannis, Safeguarding the
Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Impro-
prieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 390
n.49 (1988). Still, the article concludes that appearances are a part of the Court's due process
inquiry. Id. at 390. But see Note, Justice Without Favor: Due Process and Separation of Executive
and Judicial Powers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1676-77 (1985) (citing Taylor v.
Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), for the holding
that appearances alone are sufficient).
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standard is more practical and arguably more established in the prece-
dents than the standard adopted in Caperton.
In addition to adding the "appearance of bias" to the standard for
recusal, the Supreme Court should reconsider its emphasis on the no-
tion that a "debt of gratitude" may generate bias. As the Court began
its discussion of applying the due process precedents to the facts of
Caperton, it found a "probability of actual bias" because of Blanken-
ship's past efforts: "Though not a bribe or criminal influence, Justice
Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship
for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected. '97 Surely the Court is
right that a judge might be biased by gratitude to campaign contribu-
tors, but this backward-looking emotional tug is less important than
forward-looking political pressure and political incentives. The long-
standing label for this threat to judicial independence is "fear and
favor,"98 an emphasis on forward-looking pressures that force a judge
to deviate from his or her own judgment and bend under the weight of
political pressure and other improper influences. A judge might side
with a donor out of appreciation for past support, but the bigger dan-
ger to independence is the incentive to maintain that support in the
future ("favor") and the disincentive to turn that support into opposi-
tion in the next election ("fear").
In West Virginia, Supreme Court Justices serve twelve-year terms,
among the longest terms of state judges around the country.99 Else-
where, judges generally serve six or eight year terms m° Long terms
may insulate judges from pressure after their election, but they en-
courage a great investment of resources before the election. Dimin-
ishing political pressure ex post simply increases pressure ex ante. For
that reason, Blankenship and other special interests have an incentive
to spend more on the initial election, and have an incentive to find
true believers: judges who do not need ongoing incentives to vote a
particular way because they have internalized that view and truly be-
lieve in the cause as a matter of ideology. Where there are long terms,
a pro-life or pro-choice group would seek to elect a true believer, not
someone who needs political pressure to stay in line. The same thing
is true with industry, labor, trial lawyers, and other special interests, as
well as majoritarian interests in law and order. Blankenship may have
found a true believer in Brent Benjamin, a judge who did not need
political pressure or gratitude to vote in Massey's favor. Thus, the
97. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2262 (2009).
98. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990).
99. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
100. Other state judges' term lengths are available at www.judicialselection.us.
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question in judicial elections is not always one of political pressure
and gratitude, but of another fundamental problem of due process and
appearances of justice: the injustice of buying a seat on a court.
Blankenship could not get himself elected and subsequently hear his
own case. Why should he be able to finance a proxy for his interests,
even if that judge truly believes those interests follow the rule of law?
Thus, "the appearance of bias" standard is incomplete. The Court
should add the traditional "appearance of justice" to capture the
problem of buying a seat for a true believer.
If the Supreme Court is going to need to rely on state judges to
enforce its recusal rule for other state judges, the standard needs to be
attuned to the psychological and institutional factors at play. An "ap-
pearance of bias" standard, an "appearance of justice" standard, and a
forward-looking emphasis on fear and favor would be substantive and
practical improvements on Caperton.
V. DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF SMALL STEPS
If the U.S. Supreme Court and state courts demonstrate even a min-
imal commitment to enforcing Caperton by granting certiorari every
once in a while, the effects may multiply out to affect judicial behavior
all the way down, and then the behavior of litigants, lawyers, political
parties, and state leaders. The Supreme Court does not need to re-
view every close call. Let the Court use its "passive virtues," in Alex-
ander Bickel's terms.10 1 It can use its discretionary jurisdiction and
take recusals case-by-case, perhaps granting certiorari to police one or
two extreme cases each year. While this Article suggests that the Su-
preme Court should adopt the "appearances" standard, the Court
does not need to clarify the recusal rule by narrowing it. Bright lines
are not necessary for getting lower courts to follow its due process
ruling. Ambiguity and minimalism in opinion writing have a number
of advantages in terms of compliance in this particular field. The most
important action of the Supreme Court in these cases is not crafting a
perfect decision, but rather, simply granting certiorari every so often
in order to strike some fear in judges' hearts. Steady incrementalism
and ambiguity offer four advantages.
First, the Court does not have to worry about the exact parameters
and the limiting principles of its recusal rule for lower courts to ad-
minister because they can feel out those principles on their own. One
can question whether there is a difference between financial support
101. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 111 (2d ed. 1986).
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of elections and behind-the-scenes support of appointments, but the
Court does not need to draw such a bright line in an opinion. The
Court can wait to cross that bridge if a similarly obvious case of bias
comes before it in the future, or it can choose to observe such a dis-
tinction silently by denying certiorari on other kinds of bias questions.
Similarly, the Court can simply sidestep the "legal realism" problem
of strategic manipulation. Instead of announcing that a particular
judge is "liberal" and "pro-choice" or "conservative" and "pro-indus-
try," the Court can deny certiorari. In these potential strategic cases,
the appellant seeking the grant of certiorari will be the one seeking
recusal. In denying certiorari, the Court would be allowing the judge
below to deny the recusal request, thereby thwarting any strategic
game-playing. The main point is that the Court can control the cases
it selects-either for the degree and kind of bias involved, or for the
kinds of legal reasoning it deems appropriate or inappropriate.
Second, some continuing ambiguity in the Supreme Court prece-
dents would cause judges to err in favor of recusing themselves. No
judge ever wants to be in Judge Brent Benjamin's position, as the
poster-child for judicial corruption and with his integrity questioned in
every major newspaper in the country. One could not count the num-
ber of news stories, op-eds, and editorials excoriating Judge Benjamin
as bought and sold by Massey Coal Co. This media firestorm endan-
gered Judge Benjamin's reelection chances much more than any
amount of money that was used to finance his opponent. The Su-
preme Court's granting of certiorari is the sword of Damocles, true to
the original anecdote: with the power of the black robe and the gavel
comes responsibility and accountability. For too long, state judges
have had zero accountability for their shady campaign financing. The
prospect of sharing the harsh spotlight with Judge Benjamin will
change those expectations, and judges will start to recuse themselves if
they can smell the chance of a granted certiorari petition.
Third, the litigants and lawyers will self-regulate, even if the lines
are not clear. They will be accordingly risk averse and shy away from
crossing the fuzzier line. In high stakes elections, every additional dol-
lar spent to elect a judge gets one dollar closer to a potential recusal
by the judge herself, or eventually, the threat of the Supreme Court's
grant of certiorari. The litigant's marginal advantage of each addi-
tional dollar for electing a judge is more than counterbalanced by the
larger disadvantage of losing that same judge to recusal. The litigant
is better off staying under the radar with smaller donations, hoping
that the judge it favors gets elected, while facing no risk of recusal.
Certainly, one method of staying below the radar is diffusing the fi-
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nancial support through other employees or laundering the money
through trade groups or political action committees that could run
their own ads. But a savvy opponent knows how to alert the courts to
those evasions. The advantage of ambiguity is that the litigants will be
uncertain where the line is and will probably err in favor of avoiding
that line. Furthermore, no litigant wants to be the next Massey Coal
Co. or its C.E.O. Don Blankenship, just as no judge wants to be in the
shoes of Judge Benjamin. There is such a thing as bad publicity. Cer-
tainly, money will still flow into judicial elections, but the recusal rule
will create a constitutional chilling effect on political spending, and the
funding of judicial elections will be on a more level playing field.
Fourth, the potential spotlight on judges and litigants is also a po-
tential spotlight on particular states. Just as no one wants to be Judge
Benjamin or the C.E.O. of Massey Coal Co. right now, no state wants
the attention that West Virginia has been getting. States may feel ad-
ditional pressure to adopt reforms in order to immunize themselves
from being held up as the next judicial disaster area. Some critics
were worried that the Caperton Court was exceeding its proper role
and intruding on the states' roles or the legal profession's role in regu-
lating this problem, and they were concerned that the ruling perhaps
had taken pressure off of these other institutions to step in.102 How-
ever, the legal profession's efforts had little effect, and states had been
doing little or nothing to address this problem until the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in 2008. The movement for merit selection
and retention elections (which give judges more job security and al-
most no pressure to raise money) had stalled since the 1980s, and the
public financing efforts for judicial elections had been moving very
slowly, with some concerns that the few existing programs were in
jeopardy. State campaign financing laws are generally lax, and gener-
ally do not differentiate judges from other offices.
Then the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Caperton, and
reform efforts gained momentum. With the pending case as an un-
comfortable spotlight, West Virginia officials suddenly proposed vari-
ous reforms of the state's judicial elections, and Governor Joe
Manchin appointed an Independent Commission on Judicial Reform
that is already garnering praise. 103 Just before Caperton's Supreme
Court oral argument, Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson of the Texas Su-
preme Court called for an end to competitive judicial elections and
102. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Comment, What Everybody Knows and Too Few Accept, 123
HARV. L. REV. 104, 115-17 (2009).
103. See Matt Crist, Judiciary Report: A Starting Point, W. VA. STATE J., Nov. 19, 2009.
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decried "the corrosive influence of money" in judicial elections. 10 4 "If
the public believes that judges are biased toward contributors, then
confidence in the courts will suffer.' 10 5 The Texas media noted that
Caperton had given Chief Justice Wallace added ammunition. 10 6 The
Washington state legislature debated a public funding plan for its judi-
cial elections, along with other reforms, 07 following public financing
in New Mexico, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. 10 8 Momentum has
continued to build in other states.'0 9 On the other hand, reform ef-
forts run the risk of stalling. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, by a 4-3
vote, rejected a strict rule that donations or other campaign support
over $1,000 triggered recusal." 0 In Missouri, merit selection is under
attack by groups that are seeking a return to direct partisan elec-
tions." 1 It is not yet clear if the momentum from Caperton is suffi-
cient to overcome political inertia. The immovable object of
entrenched interests may be able to withstand the force of reform,
unless the Supreme Court adds more force so as to make it irresistible.
Certainly, state appellate courts will also face the dilemma of how
to apply the recusal rule, but they might find a solution in directing
these claims to already existing state judicial ethics panels, and where
they do not yet exist, a state supreme court might find enough incen-
tive to create them. Independent ethics panels would shield the state
courts from these kinds of debacles, and they could review recusal
requests more efficiently. State ethics panels could navigate their own
path through the problems of limiting principles and strategic games-
manship without facing the same kinds of institutional problems that
face the state courts.
104. Chuck Lindell, Chief Justice Seeks to Abolish Judicial Elections, AUSTIN AM. STATES-
MAN, Feb. 12, 2009.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also Editorial, High Court Ruling Helps Reform Call, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS
NEWS, June 28, 2009, http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/High court-rulinghelps reform_
call.html.
107. Brad Shannon, Bill Looks at Judicial Race Funding, OLYMPIAN, Feb. 2, 2009; Chris
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GENCER, June 15, 2009.
108. Id.; Public Funding Available for Supreme Court Races, Wis. L.J., Dec. 2, 2009.
109. For up to date news on judicial selection and reform, see http://www.judicialselection.us/
news/index.cfm?state=.
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J.-SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/67012672.htm.
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The first and only Supreme Court decision to focus on the problem
of money in judicial elections has begun to educate the public about
the problems with judicial elections. These reform efforts will be even
more successful if they are driven by knowledge, not just fear. The
Supreme Court has an opportunity to fulfill its educating function,
borrowing from a very different aspect of Bickel's vision for the Su-
preme Court's role in democracy. The Court has an opportunity to
define the rule of law and the basic notions of due process, and it has
an opportunity to shape a reform effort. Its actual ruling in Caperton
could be wisely minimalist and even ambiguous, but its discussion of
due process and fairness should be bold, direct, accessible, and
inspiring.
It is also crucial that we understand the arguments of the respon-
dents, Massey Coal Co., in this case. Campaign donations by special
interests are not the only threat to judicial independence in our soci-
ety. There are many different forms of fear and favor that undercut
the rule of law in both elected courts and appointed courts. Whereas
the respondents were making this argument to suggest that reform is
futile, history teaches that reform is inevitable, and for much of Amer-
ican history, reformers succeeded in promoting one form or another
of judicial independence. But changes in selection generally yield
only relative independence: elections create more independence from
one institution or set of political forces, but also create more depen-
dence on other institutions and political forces. The same is true for
non-partisan elections and merit selection. Reforms that yield inde-
pendence in more absolute terms include lengthening terms; involving
multiple branches or bodies in the selection process; establishing bar-
riers to removal or discipline; fixing salaries and material support; and
maintaining protections of jurisdiction. We should be focusing more
on absolute independence.
History also teaches that reform comes in sudden waves-the
Founding, the sweeping adoption of judicial elections from 1846 to
1851, the lengthening of terms around 1870, the rise of non-partisan
elections in the 1910s, and the spread of the merit plan in the 1960s
and 1970s. 112 Could Caperton v. Massey trigger another wave of re-
112. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2011); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Eco-
nomic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forth-
coming March 2011).
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form? That is up to Justice Kennedy and the Court's willingness to
return to these issues, to clarify that appearances matter, and to
demonstrate that Caperton was not a one-shot deal for the Court.
